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Tindel: Tindel: Insurance

INSURANCE*
JOHN C. TINDEL**

There are probably few lawyers who do not know of instances of
automobile accidents in which the party at fault had no liability insurance
and few assets, leaving the innocent party virtually uncompensated for
loss and injuries. The development of unsatisfied judgment or uninsured
motorist coverage appears to offer a solution to this problem. However,
this type of coverage has not yet been interpreted by the courts. In State
ex rel. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Craig," the Springfield Court of
Appeals was faced with such a problem. The insurance company sought
to intervene in a damage action against an uninsured motorist, brought by
one of its policyholders who had this type of coverage. State Farm had
attempted to provide ground rules to cover this situation. First, the policy
had provided that the determination of whether the insured was legally
entitled to recover against the uninsured driver and, if so, the amount of
damages, would be made by agreement between the company and the
insured or, in the event they failed to agree, by arbitration. Second, an
exclusion clause provided that the policy would not apply if the insured
settled with the uninsured driver or recovered a judgment against him
without written consent of the company. Both of these provisions were
virtually eliminated by the court. The arbitration provision fell within
the province of § 435.010, RSMo 1959, which makes an arbitration provision
no bar to litigation. The court also noted the familiar doctrine that contract
provisions cannot oust a court of jurisdiction as to a determination of
liability, even in the absence of statute.
The consent requirement was disposed of as being against public policy,
requiring, in effect, the consent of the adverse party before bringing suit.
No authority was cited on this point.
Beyond these points any effort to read the case for future guidance
becomes difficult because the court insists that this case is decided only on
*This article contains a discussion of selected Missouri court decisions reported in volumes 357 through 368 of South Western Reporter, Second Series.
**Attorney, Nevada, Missouri; A.B. 1956; LL.B. 1963, University of Missouri.
1. 364 S.W.2d 343 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963)
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its facts and is not to be applied to other cases. But one very clear problem
area emerges. The court, after emphasizing that on the facts in this case
the company does not have to defend the insured on a counterclaim, points
out, "We see no conflict of interest or position. ' ' 2 The question immediately
arises, what if there were a counterclaim? This would raise a real possibility of conflict of interest. The decision gives no assistance in resolving
this problem, but it is one that companies writing this type of coverage
will have to meet.
The court allowed the company to intervene. Does this mean that the
company generally can expect to intervene? The court says, "For the reasons
assigned, we believe that, under the facts peculiar to this case, the relator
should be permitted to intervene as a matter of right."3 And further, "What
we have said and held is of course applicable only to this case, . . .Y4 and
".. . we express no opinion and intend no holding except as applied to
the specific situation before us." 5 It is impossible to ascertain what will

be the result in the next case involving this type of coverage.
Another notable case involving insurance proceeds and the doctrine
of equitable conversion is Skelly Oil Co. v. Ashimore.6 In this case after a
contract of sale was executed but before closing, a building burned.7 The
court held that when a building is destroyed under these circumstances,
and the building ".

.

. constituted an important part of the subject matter

of the contract ... the'contract is to be construed as subject to the implied
condition that it no longer shall be binding if, before the time for the
conveyance to be made, the buildings are destroyed by fire. The loss by
the fire falls upon the vendor, the owner; and if he had not protected
,
himself by insurance, he can have no reimbursement of this loss. ..
the
land,
wanted
who
defendant,
the
that
However, the court concluded
was entitled to complete the purchase with the insurance proceeds substituted for the destroyed building.
In closing real estate transactions, the very practical problem of dividing insurance expenses between buyer and seller will need some revision.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Id. at 346.
Id. at 349.
Ibid.
Ibid.

6. 365 S.W.2d 583 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
7. See 28 Mo. L. REv. 641 (1963).
8. Supra note 6, at 589.
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Since in case of loss, the proceeds of the policy may reduce the purchase
price, it would appear that the person who is really being protected is
the purchaser. Would it not then be proper to charge the purchaser with
the insurance premium after the date of the contract?
Three cases arose from the financial troubles of insurance companies.
In First National Bank of Kansas City v. Higgins,9 plaintiff, a judgment
creditor of the insured, attempted to reach the proceeds of a reinsurance
policy issued in favor of an insolvent insurance company. The Superintendent of the Division of Insurance, as receiver of the insolvent company, asserted a claim to the reinsurance proceeds for the benefit of all
creditors of the company. The Superintendent relied on a provision in
the reinsurance policy which provided that "Payments under this Agreement shall be made directly to the Company or to its liquidator, receiver
or statutory successor ... "I,0
There was disagreement as to whether the event insured against was
an actual loss by the insured company, as when payment of a claim was
actually made, or whether it was against liability to make a payment,
without the necessity of a payment. The court pointed out that the agreeent was not drafted so as to make clear just which interpretation was proper.
However, the court concluded that liability alone, and not loss, was insured
against.
After deciding that the event insured against had occurred, the court
was faced with two claims for the proceeds. Plaintiff argued that this was
basically a third-party beneficiary contract for his benefit, while the Superintendent viewed the proceeds as additional assets of the insolvent company.
The supreme court, by a 4-3 decision, found for plaintiff, citing Hornan
v. Reinsurance Corp.11 However, the Homan case was primarily concerned
with the first question, that of indemnity against loss or liability. The
question of payment to receiver or claimant was not really at issue there.
This was pointed out by the dissenters. 12 The result reached by the majority
seems more appropriate, however, since the fund in question owes its
existence to the claim asserted by plaintiff. If it were not for his claim,
there would be no fund, and other creditors of the insolvent insurance
9.
10.
11.
12.

357 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
Id. at 141.
345 Mo. 650, 136 S.W.2d 289 (1940).
Supra note 9, at 150.
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company are not being deprived of anything that they would normally
have a right to reach in satisfaction of their claims.
The other two cases, Clay v. Independence Mutual Ins. Co.1 and Clay
v. Eagle Recprocal Exchange, 4 illustrate the risk involved to the agent
when an insurance company becomes insolvent. Briefly, the procedure to
be followed in case of insolvency is this: After the Superintendent of the
Division of Insurance is declared receiver of the company, all rights of the
parties become fixed. The agent may not cancel the policies on his own
initiative after business has been suspended, even though the agent has no
notice of the insolvency and suspension. The Independence case also suggests, by way of dictum, that an agent has no authority to cancel a policy
and rewrite the insurance with another company without a request from
the insured, even while the company is doing business.
As a part of the gathering of assets of the company, all premiums due
for the full term of the policies are collected and an agent holding premiums
for the company must pay them to the receiver. When the receiver cancels
all the policies of the company, the agent must then remit all the unearned
commissions on the canceled policies. And the agent may not set off any
amounts due him from the company, since this would give him a preference
over other creditors. He must take his share of the assets, as must the
policyholders who seek the return of their unearned premiums, after payment of liquidation expenses, taxes, and all matured policy claims.1 5 Thus,
insurance agents are faced with the possibility of loss to themselves in the
event of insolvency of a company which they represent.
Insurance policies are drafted by skilled and experienced lawyers with
the intent of avoiding litigation as much as possible. But even so, it has
been necessary in several cases to litigate in order to determine whether a
particular set of facts falls within or without the coverage of the policy.
Some of the questions arising during the past year are:
1. What constitutes failure to "promptly . . . turn over" funds under

a burglary policy?16

13. Clay v. Independence Mutual Ins. Co., 359 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1962).
14. Clay v. Eagle Reciprocal Exchange, 368 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. 1963).

15. § 375.700, RSMo 1959.

16. Consumers Money Order Corp. v. Pettit, 358 S.W.2d 422 (K.C. Mo. App.

1962).
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2. Is a friend of the insured's son an additional insured when the
evidence shows the son did not have authority to lend the car?17
3. Is a boy hired on a day-to-day basis to help in the hay harvest an
employee?18
4. If a business building is not "open for business" is it vacant?10
Sometimes, however, the draftsman may slip. Phillips Hotel Operating
Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. 20 found the reverse of the old saw "The
policy giveth and the endorsement taketh away." The policy itself provided no coverage for loss of guests' money or other property, but an endorsement extended coverage to property of guests left with the hotel for
safekeeping. After certain valuable jewelry disappeared mysteriously from
the hotel safe, the company refused to pay, claiming that the endorsement
covered only burglary of guests' property, not mysterious disappearance.
The court concluded that "no amount of weaseling"'21 would avoid the
broader interpretation of the coverage.
Missouri appellate courts follow a consistent course of reasonable interpretation of policy provisions. When earlier cases are cited the courts
generally treat them as persuasive, but unless the facts are identical, earlier
decisions do not seem to dictate results. The attitude seems to be one of
finding the right solution to this problem, but with little effort or intent
to set down rules to govern all other similar cases. For example, in Farm
Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. FarmersMutual Auto Ins. Co.,22 each side came
into court with one case almost in point in its favor. The court made no
particular effort to lay down guidelines for the bar, but only applied one
of the two cases on the basis that the facts were closer. In the future, on
a slightly different set of facts, this same controversy will probably be
litigated again, this time with one side having two cases, the other still
having one. It is interesting to note that of eight cases involving a single
insurance 'company which denied coverage under a policy, the insured or
23
claimant recovered in seven.
17. MFA Mutual Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 361 S.W.2d 171 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962).
18. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Farmers Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 360
S.W.2d 325 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
19. Limbaugh v. Columbia Ins. Co. of New York, 368 S.W.2d 921 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1963).
20. 366 S.W.2d 54 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
21. Id. at 56.
22. Supra note 18.
23. It is sometimes amazing to see how far these decisions will go. In Johnson v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 364 S.W.2d 68 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962),
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
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One case should be of particular interest to lenders. In Northwestern
National Ins. Co. v. Mildenberger,24 a building owned by R was conveyed
by a deed of trust to T as security for a debt of about $10,000 owed to E.
The building burned, and a loss of $3,389.43 occurred. Before payment by
the insurance company, T proceeded to sell the building, R being in default.
E bought at the sale for the full amount of the debt plus costs of sale.
Then both R and E claimed the proceeds of the policy. The company paid
the amount into court and interpleaded both R and E. The policy contained a union mortgage clause for the benefit of E.
This was a case of first impression, but the court followed the decisions
of other states in concluding that the insurance fund must be paid to R.
E had three ways of recovering his debt. He could sell the property and
apply the proceeds to the note; he could collect the insurance proceeds and
apply them; or he could go against R on his personal obligation. But having
satisfied the debt by one means he may not then pursue the others. The
sale by the trustee for the full amount of the debt extinguished any obligation due E by anyone. Mortgagees should be advised that if they have any
claim that will not be fully satisfied by owning the property in its present
condition, this should be taken into account in making their bid at the
sale. "It cannot seriously be contended that the mortgagee could have
kept the insurance proceeds and also have recovered in full the payment
of the debt owed to it.1125
In spite of the considerable amount of litigation, both old and new,
it is still possible to have a fact situation that is yet undecided by the
courts. With the growing importance of insurance in the lives of all of us,
it is hoped that Missouri courts will keep in mind the importance of each
decision in planning future conduct by people all over the state. Each
case is important to the litigants, but there is a wider audience that must
be considered.

the company lost even though any casual reader of the decision will recognize the
impossibility of a rainstorm coming through an open door to the basement and
collecting 18 inches of water in the basement when the claimant's own testimony
indicated that the basement drains were open.
24. 359 S.W.2d 380 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
25. Id. at 385.
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